I know this will sound like I am defending Obama. In reality, I believe there are some specific errors made by the Rumsfield-Cheney coterie surrounding President Bush, early in the war. Some of their blinders stemmed from partisanship, and their (extreme partisan) circle-the-wagons mentality probably didn't help.

Somewhat later the Democrats, when the tide of opinion turned against the war, made a similar slide into an overly restricted mindset, emulating the message of Cindy Sheehan (when they should have also heard the perspectives of the likes of Colin Powell, Joe Lieberman, or Nouri Al-Malaki --- or now, of Bing West).

Extreme Partisanship -- and its costs
The Republicans were bent on purging their inner circle of all dissent. They seemed (well, so it looks now) to want to grab all the glory for Iraq, and opted for partisanship of an intense conservative (ideological) variety.

At first it looked impressive, the outstanding rapid performance and achievement of the soldiers and marines, the dramatic air power, the heavy reliance on overwhelming force. The obsession (and triumph) of the US "shock and awe" campaign.

But alternative voices were quietly warning not to lose sight of broader issues in the Iraqi and middle eastern context.

Cheney and Rumsfield virtually took over the reins of power, Bush acceded to the narrowly conservative perspective, and alternative viewpoints were increasingly excluded. End the discussio, time to act.

Sure, it worked for a while (and to that extent, rightfully deserves its due -- see Bing West, The Strongest Tribe). In the wake of 9-11 President Bush provided a strong response in the form of assertive, forceful leadership on the world stage (not always to universal applause), but hey, some of the middle eastern capitals that were dancing in the streets after 9-11, now are scraping and genuflecting, a bit more "eager to please" the West in general, and America in particular. Qadaffi of Libya hasted to make friends with the US. Syria extended its welcome to Pelosi more recently. Even Iran's unpredictable Ahmadinejad has written jumbled (quasi religious) "let's be friends" letters to Bush and others.

The initial over-reliance on shock and awe in Iraq was of only limited benefit, taking down Saddam, removing the (Sunni) Baathists. Leading the war, the close coterie around Bush circled the wagons, got rid of Colin Powell (and his voice of balance), erected walls of suspicion against any "divergent" views whatsoever, mistrusting even the State Department with their experts, Arabists, etc. It became a partisan war, led by the hard right, Rumsfield, Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle -- aided and abetted by the hard right Republicans in Congress - the DeLay intensely partisan ideologues.

How wrong these leaders were to reject the counsel of a range of alternative voices and viewpoints. A native counsel says, listen to the elders and holy-men, then listen to the warriors and young men, then listen to the sqaws, then sleep, and hearken to your dreams, then go back to the council and speak your own judgment, then listen again. Then decide.

The whiteman Bible has other ways of the same thing, "There is safety in the multitude of counsel."

The Bush defenders justify their heavy reliance on the force option for so long, their obsession with the Baathists (Sunni) side of the equation, and say they had to have unity, everyone on the same page, had to have team players. Time was of the essence.

All that may be true, or partly true, but the fact remains that in 2004, 2005, and 2006, the war bogged down, the insurgency intensified, casualities (both Iraqi civilian and coalition) skyrocketted, and war costs soared.

In 2006, Congress, on its own, began to take on an advisory role. On their own initiative, Senators and Congressmen of both parties and a range of views and perspectives began talking together, invited in a long list of experts, military strategists, Arabist scholars, academics, and sought their views. Their motive was not to undercut the administration, but rather simply to make an effort to heed the Constitution's injucntion to the senate to advise the President. Thus they came up with the bipartisan Iraq Study Group Report

Then a dramatic event added emphasis to this "outside" set of ideas --- the election upset removing Republicans from control, both both House and Senate, and their replacement with Democratic rule.

The next week the President removed Rumsfield and (soon) replaced him with Robert Gates, one of the prominent voices calling for the broad-based ideas then gaining prominence in the Iraq Study Group Report. Thus, the turn around is due as much to independents and academics and even Democrats as it is to the (former) inner Bush circle.

Petraeus gets a lion's share of credit, but consider Lincoln, who went through a half dozen generals before he finally found Grant.

Petraeus apparently was nothing if not a powerful LISTENER. He called in outsiders, Arabists, academics, culture experts, and he listened to LOCALS. The Sunni minority was paranoid about Shi'ites (with Iranian backing) taking revenge for Saddam and the Baathists (all Sunni).

Military force still had its role, but it could never have worked without the broad-based approach long suggested by Condi Rice and Lieberman and others, but rejected by Cheney and Rumsfield, who wanted only to win and get out. (Shock-and-Awe)

Quietly but steadily, the anthropologists and state-department types' influence was felt. With Petraeus blessing, a counter-insurgency effort formed, and trust building efforts began to bear fruit, with conditions of the ground taken into very serious consideration. Charlie Rose hosted two of these anthropologists, Sarah Sewall and Montgomery McFate, and the quiet success of the new approach being implemented was self-evident.

The hearts-and-minds strategy was effective, I believe, because it incorporated a multi-facetted, multi-lateral approach in Iraq, concerned with a win-win-win emphasis on the future.

The old unilateralism of the Rumsfield - Cheney crowd back-fired. Or rather, its effectiveness was limited (if necessary for a while). There is only so much that sheer force can do. The surge was able to work only because it was balanced with the kind of inclusive approach of the new Hearts-And-Minds strategy.